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ABSTRACT 
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and several other states have recently pro-
posed employer tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies have 
recently been passed at the federal level. The authors find that such policies, in fact, do little to increase 
aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of labor in an economy with high 
unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand They suggest a more effective approach to creating jobs 
in the states: increasing spending in labor-intensive sectors and programs that are matched by federal 
funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be particularly effective if they were financed through 
temporary high-income tax increases. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and several other states have recently pro-
posed employer tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. A similar policy has 
recently been adopted at the federal level. 
These policies are not likely to have a substantial positive impact on employment generation, either at the 
federal or state level. The obstacles to success for such measures at the state level are particularly high. 
This is because balanced budget requirements and caps on the size of the credits effectively negate the 
potential of state-level employer tax credits to create any jobs.  
For effectively fighting the recession and mass unemployment, there is no substitute for effective coun-
tercyclical policies operating at the federal level. At the same time, states can generate some jobs by in-
creasing spending in labor intensive sectors and on programs that bring in federal matching funds, 
particularly if they are willing to use temporary taxes on affluent households to finance the spending.  
The three proposals considered in this discussion vary in the details of the proposal, but little in the po-
tential impacts.  
  Massachusetts: $2,500 refundable tax credit for firms with fewer than 50 employees that hire full-
time workers and maintain the position for at least one year between April 2010 and April 2012. 
Credit is capped at $50 million, and is refundable and based on withholding tax. 
  Connecticut: $2,500 for each full-time employee hired at firms with fewer than 25 employees. Non-
refundable credit against state corporate income tax liabilities, thus applies only to profitable firms. Applies to hires that occur between January 2010 and December 2012, and available for two years 
beyond the year of the hire.  
  Rhode Island: $2,000 non-refundable credit against state corporate income tax liabilities for each 
full-time employee hired at firms with between 5 and 100 employees. Applies to hires that occur be-
tween July 2010 and December 2011, for workers that were unemployed, receiving public assis-
tance, or finishing a post-high school degree in previous 24 months. Hires must also be paid at least 
250 percent of the state minimum wage and remain with the firm for 18 months. 
 
The state-level programs are similar to the new federal policy, the “Small Business Jobs and Wages Tax 
Cut,” which will refund $5,000 plus the employer’s share of Social Security taxes (6.2 percent of payroll 
under $106,000) for new hires at expanding firms in 2010.  
The basic economic rationale behind these proposals is that if workers are less costly, employers will 
have greater incentive to employ them, and this could cause firms to do more hiring. But findings from 
separate studies by the Economic Policy Institute and the Congressional Budget Office both lead to the 
conclusion that the federal policy will have modest employment impact – somewhere between 8 and 18 
jobs per million dollars of credit. Historical evidence from the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) program of 
1977-78 indicates that the total job creation from a federal program could, in reality, be as low as 4 per 
million dollars in credit.1 
Job creation from state policies can be expected to be even significantly weaker than these federal num-
bers. Because the state proposals are small, targeted to small firms, and capped at relatively low levels 
they can be expected to generate little, if any, gross job gains. The credits are not generous enough to 
motivate many firms that weren’t already planning on hiring to do so, and will possibly be entirely con-
sumed by the existing volume of hiring and expansion at small firms. Since the state credits have to be 
financed under a balanced budget, they cannot be expected to cause net increases in employment. The 
job losses resulting from decreased state spending will almost certainly outstrip the number of jobs cre-
ated by the credits. . 
These factors make it almost certain that the employment impact of the proposed tax credits will be well 
below the low end of the CBO estimate of 8-18 jobs per million dollars of credit. If spending on other parts 
of state budgets is reduced to finance these tax credits, the employment impacts will likely be negative. 
Certainly the job figures will come nowhere near the expectations expressed by the Governors: 400 jobs 
per million dollars of credit in Massachusetts and 95 jobs per million dollars in Rhode Island.  
As a job-creation engine, the tax credit compares unfavorably with a range of other options on which 
these states might alternatively spend these same funds. For example, each million dollars of spending 
on early childhood education would yield 30 jobs in Massachusetts and 33 in Connecticut and Rhode Is-
land. Spending on state infrastructure projects would generate 12 jobs per million dollars in each of the 
states. Especially if it is financed through progressive tax on high-income households, spending on these 
programs can generate real net increases in employment. And spending in other areas, particularly 
                                                            
1 See note 13. Applying Tannenwald’s finding for the own-price elasticity of the demand for labor in response to the New Jobs Credit of 
1977-78 to Bartik’s model yields this job creation figure. 
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 healthcare, can create relatively large numbers of jobs, since state spending on Medicaid is matched by 
the federal government. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and several other states have recently proposed employer 
tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. A similar policy has recently been 
adopted at the federal level. 
These policies are not likely to have a substantial positive impact on employment generation, either at the 
federal or state level. The obstacles to success for such measures at the state level are particularly high. 
This is because balanced budget requirements and caps on the size of the credits effectively negate the 
potential of state-level employer tax credits to create any jobs, even if the credits are otherwise well-
designed. For effectively fighting the recession and mass unemployment, the fact is that there is no sub-
stitute for effective countercyclical policies operating at the federal level.  At the same time, states can 
generate a small number of additional jobs by increasing spending in labor intensive sectors and on pro-
grams that bring in federal matching funds, particularly if they are willing to use temporary taxes on afflu-
ent households to finance the spending. 
THE TAX CREDIT PROPOSALS  
The Great Recession of 2008-09 has had severe repercussions on the livelihoods of tens of millions of 
people throughout the United States.  More than 8 million jobs have been lost since the nation fell into 
recession in December 2007. Official unemployment stands today at 9.7 percent (March 2010), and un-
employment is expected to average 8.0 percent even in 2012, according the latest forecast by the Con-
gressional Budget Office. While the Obama administration’s $787 billion American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act stimulus package has certainly helped, creating 2 million jobs since it was enacted in 
early 2009, it was too small to address the full extent of the economic downturn. Further steps are 
needed if we want to avoid high unemployment for years to come.1  
a. Federal policy 
One of the notable recent policy ideas for generating job growth is the employer tax credit, proposed by 
Tim Bartik, John Bishop and the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). In October 2009 Bartik and Bishop pro-
posed a two-year $190 billion Job Creation Tax Credit (JCTC), which would refund 15% of any payroll taxes 
incurred by added wage costs, whether due to new hires, increased hours, or increased wages.2 Accord-
ing to Bartik and Bishop’s analysis, the JCTC would create 27 new jobs for every $1 million in tax credit 
between 2010 and 2011, with the cost per job falling further if increased income tax payments and de-
creased public benefit receipt for newly employed workers are also taken into consideration.  
In his February State of the Union Address, President Obama laid out a very similar proposal called the 
“Small Business Jobs and Wages Tax Cut” (JWTC). The JWTC would refund $5,000 plus the employer’s 
share of Social Security taxes (6.2 percent of payroll under $106,000) for new hires at expanding firms in 
2010.3 Because the President’s proposal was quite similar to the JCTC, economists at EPI concluded it 
would have roughly the same impact on jobs. The version of the credit that emerged from the House and 
Senate, and was ultimately signed into law by President Obama, however, provides only a credit of 6.2 
percent of payroll costs for hiring long-term unemployed workers in 2010, whether the firms actually ex-
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 pand or not.4 Because of these key differences, Bartik estimates this version of tax credit would create 
only 13 jobs per $1 million in tax credits.5 
b. State policies 
As the federal proposals worked their way through the political process, several states introduced ver-
sions of these jobs tax credits. Governor Patrick of Massachusetts proposed a $2,500 refundable tax 
credit for firms with fewer than 50 employees that hire full-time workers and keep them employed for at 
least one year between April 2010 and April 2012.6 The value of the credit is capped at $50 million, and 
since it is refundable and based on withholding tax, the credit will still be available to firms that generate 
no profit.7  
Governor Rell of Connecticut made a somewhat similar proposal, an expansion of the “Jobs Creation Tax 
Credit Program (JCTCP)” in Connecticut.8 The JCTCP expansion provides $2,500 for each full-time em-
ployee hired at firms with fewer than 25 employees. Because it is a non-refundable credit against state 
corporate income tax liabilities, it applies only to profitable firms. It applies to hires that occur between 
January 2010 and December 2012, and is available to the firm for two years beyond the year of the hire.9 
So, in practice the $10 million annual cap on the credit could cost the state up to $50 million.  
The proposal Governor Carcieri put forward for Rhode Island is broadly similar to those in the other states. 
The “Small Business Jobs Act” would give a non-refundable credit of $2,000 to small firms hiring unem-
ployed Rhode Islanders into full-time jobs with decent wages between July 2010 and December 2011.10 
Eligible firms must have at least five and no more than 100 employees in the state.11 Eligible employees 
need to be working at least 30 hours per week and have been receiving Unemployment Insurance, a re-
cent participant in the states’ welfare program, or graduated from a college or technical school at some 
time in the previous 24 months. The credit is effectively targeted to expanding firms, not simply hiring 
firms, by requiring that the size of the firm not decline and that the hired worker remain with the firm for 
18 months. There are also several important distinctions between the proposals in Rhode Island and 
those in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Eligible workers in Rhode Island are required to make an hourly 
wage of at least $18.50 – 250 percent of the state’s minimum wage – and also be eligible for an em-
ployer-provided health insurance plan. And, although the state has estimated the credit will cost $10 mil-
lion, there is no cap and the total size of the credit. 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND LIMITS OF THE PROPOSALS 
The basic economic rationale behind these proposals is that they would reduce the cost to employers of 
hiring workers. If workers are less costly, employers will have greater incentive to employ them, and this 
could cause firms to do more hiring. Governor Patrick, for example, claims that “this will encourage the 
hiring of up to 20,000 people,” expecting that 400 jobs will be created for each million dollars of tax 
credit. This estimate, however, is simply built by dividing the cap on the credit ($50 million) by the size of 
the credit ($2,500) and does not reflect any serious attempt to discern the credit’s impact. To his credit, 
Governor Carcieri acknowledges that most of the jobs receiving the credit in Rhode Island will go to firms 
that would have been growing even without the new policy. His administration has budgeted $10 million 
for the “Small Business Jobs Act” and expects it will create 950 jobs in Rhode Island, 95 jobs for each 
million dollars of tax credit.12  
In practice there is good reason to think the state-level credits will generate very little, if any, hiring of new 
employees. Even the federal credits, which have advantages over the state-level credits, are unlikely to 
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 generate as many jobs as are being projected. The state-level policies, with small credits, low caps and 
the accompanying balanced budget requirements, will certainly perform far worse.  
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF A FEDERAL CREDIT 
a. The elasticity of labor demand 
The amount of new employment generated by any federal tax credit is largely a function of the size of the 
credit and how responsive employers are to temporary reductions in total compensation. In the EPI pro-
posal, Bartik and Bishop use a measure of firms’ responsiveness –the ‘own-price elasticity of demand for 
labor’– of 0.3; if compensation declines by 10 percent, firms will increase their demand for labor by 3 per-
cent. This is the “best estimate” of the range of estimates of the long-run elasticity of the demand for labor 
based on Daniel Hamermesh’s seminal work on labor demand.13 In the short-run – more relevant in this 
situation, given the temporary nature of the credit – the elasticity will be lower, however. And in a period of 
particularly weak demand, employers will likely be even less responsive. Using an elasticity from the lower 
end of Hammermesh’s range – 0.15 – the number of jobs per million dollars of credit falls from 27 to 15. 
Estimating the JCTC job creation based on the lower (0.15) elasticity – 15 jobs per million dollars of credit 
– generates results much closer to those in the recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of similar 
employer tax credit proposals.14 The CBO concludes that under any payroll tax cut proposal “most of the 
money forgone by the government would go to reduce employers’ taxes for existing workers, so—per dol-
lar of forgone revenues—the added incentive to increase employment and hours worked would be small.” 
If the payroll tax cut were restricted to firms that were expanding payrolls, the CBO estimates that the pol-
icy would create between 8 and 18 full-time jobs per million dollars of credit.  
b. Analogous and historical policy comparisons 
It is unclear in the current economic environment how responsive firms would actually be to these sorts of 
tax credits. With demand for goods and services seriously depressed, unemployment high and wages fal-
ling, it is not obvious that a tax credit for hiring would actually cause firms to expand their employment 
and operations. Much of the interest in this type of tax credit, however, is based on the perceived success 
of the 1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC). Studies by Bishop (1981)and Perloff and Wachter (1979), as 
well as surveys of small businesses (McEvitt, 1978) do provide some evidence that firms added jobs as a 
result of the credit.15  
Yet there is also evidence suggesting caution in interpreting these findings. The new jobs identified by 
these studies were based on the differences in employment gains between firms that knew about the 
NJTC and those that did not. Firms that knew about the credit seemed to grow 3 percent faster than 
those that did not (Perloff and Wachter, 1979). But these studies are unable to rule out the possibility 
that firms knew about the credit because they were already planning to hire new workers.  
Based on an extensive employer survey combined with the payroll records of Wisconsin firms, Tannen-
wald (1982) found that most firms with knowledge of the NJTC did not increase hiring, and that the im-
plied own-price elasticity of the demand for labor in response to the policy was just 0.04.16 Firms did not 
hire because demand for their product simply did not warrant increased production. Tannenwald also 
found that there were also important organizational and informational gaps. At many firms the people 
doing the hiring had little interaction with the people filing taxes, and the timeframe for hiring is often very 
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 different than the timeframe for filing taxes. Using the elasticity from Tannenwald’s research suggests as 
little as 4 jobs per million dollars of tax credit. 
Such weak employment impacts are consistent with observation of other policy interventions that affect 
labor costs, in particular raising the minimum wage by modest amounts. The “consensus” view of labor 
economists is that the demand for teenage labor falls one percent in response to an increase in the 
minimum of 10 percent (an elasticity of 0.1), and many studies find the relationship is indistinguishable 
from zero.17  
c. Federal policies and deficit financing 
Federal policies that would reduce the payroll taxes of firms have the potential to increase net employ-
ment during a recession largely because the federal government can engage in deficit spending. In the 
absence of this ability, gross job gains from the credit would be weighed against gross job losses from the 
offsetting budget cuts or tax increases, resulting in a net change in employment much smaller than re-
ported by EPI or the CBO, likely very close to zero. Whether that net increase is positive or negative would 
depend on the responsiveness of the sectors benefiting from the tax credit and the labor intensity of the 
sectors experiencing budget cuts. 
LIMITATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL CREDITS 
State-level impacts from similar policies are likely to be smaller than even the most limited expectations 
at the national level. In their federal proposal, Bartik and Bishop note that state-level versions of these tax 
credits will have little impact on jobs because they are likely to be poorly designed, and any employment 
impacts will be undermined by state budget rules. For a new jobs tax credit to be effective, Bishop warns 
that 1) it needs to be a significant share of labor costs; 2) it should not favor low-wage, high-turnover 
firms, and; 3) there should not be a firm-level cap on the amount of credit that can be received.18 By 
these criteria “poor design” is a factor in all three state’s proposals, which are restricted to small (high-
turnover) firms, and – in two cases – have low caps on total amount of the credit. And all states face bal-
anced budget requirements which will force budget cuts or other tax increases to offset the revenue lost 
through the credit.  
WASTED EFFORT – REWARDING ALREADY PLANNED EXPANSION 
Even supporters of the federal credits acknowledge that many firms that were already planning on expand-
ing would benefit from the credit. According to EPI’s own analysis, under the best-case scenario, for every 
job created because of the EPI-proposed tax credit in 2010 and 2011, more than six other jobs that were 
already going to be created would also benefit from the credit. This is arguably acceptable at the federal 
level because these benefiting firms may in turn increase their demand for additional workers or other ma-
terials and equipment.19 Moreover since the federal credit does not have a cap, the fact that these al-
ready-expanding firms take the credit does not exclude other firms from expanding because of the credit. 
This is not the case with the state-level credits. By capping the value of the credit, it is possible that the full 
amount budgeted for the credit in Massachusetts and Connecticut could be consumed by firms that were 
already going to expand. 
The credits would be available to any small firm adding net new full-time jobs in Massachusetts between 
April 2010 and April 2012, in Rhode Island between July 2010 and December 2011, and any small firm 
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 hiring workers in Connecticut between January 2010 and December 2012. There is no way for the states 
to distinguish between jobs added because of the credit and those that would have been added anyway. 
This is a major problem for the state-level credits, since even in a deep recession many firms expand em-
ployment and even more engage in replacement hiring.  
The existing volume of hiring and expansion among small firms suggests that much, if not all, of the credit 
could be absorbed by hiring that was already going to happen. Because the state credits are capped, only 
20,000 Massachusetts jobs and 4,000 Connecticut jobs can claim the credit in a single year. The avail-
able data do not allow us to precisely compare recent hiring to the categories laid out in the Connecticut 
and Massachusetts proposals, particularly the requirements for employment tenure and that the jobs 
must be full-time. However, since eighty percent of all jobs are full-time and the job tenure of the typical 
worker is four years, it remains quite possible, given the following data, to conclude that the current level 
of hiring among small firms in Massachusetts and Connecticut will be sufficient to fully absorb the pro-
posed employer tax credits.  
In the second quarter of 2009, Massachusetts added approximately 47,000 jobs at expanding firms with 
fewer than 50 employees and 19,000 jobs at newly created firms with fewer than 50 employees.20 In 
Connecticut 16,000 jobs were added at expanding firms with fewer than 20 employees and 6,900 jobs 
were added at newly created firms with fewer than 20 employees.21  
In Rhode Island, where there is no cap proposed on the total size of the credit, the implications of existing 
levels of job growth at small firms are different. Instead of potentially “using up” allocated funding levels, 
existing job growth will possibly push the costs of the credit higher than anticipated by the state and al-
most certainly shift the composition of jobs rewarded under the credit. Less of the total amount of the 
credit will be award to jobs “created” by the credit than the state anticipates. In the second quarter of 
2009, expanding firms with between 5 and 100 employees in Rhode Island added 7,700 jobs, and 1,200 
jobs were added at newly opened firms of a similar size.  
Because of employment turnover and business closings, we cannot simply multiply quarterly gross job 
gains figures by four to obtain annual estimates. Workers who are hired might later quit or be fired, and 
firms that expand in one quarter might contract in the next. In general, however, for expanding firms of all 
sizes in these three New England states, the level of gross job gains in a given quarter is usually two-
thirds of the level of gross job gains across an entire year.22 For newly opened firms, the quarterly gross 
job gains are roughly one-third of job gains over an entire year. 
The volume of hiring – relevant here because the Connecticut credit is based on the number of full-time 
hires, not firm expansion – is even greater. Between December 2007 and December 2009 (the most re-
cent data) an average of 52,000 workers were hired each month in Connecticut. Over the same period 
monthly hiring averaged 98,000 workers in Massachusetts and 15,000 workers in Rhode Island (Figure 
1).23 In spite of all of this hiring, total employment declined steeply over this period because this is less 
hiring than takes place in an expansion, and because layoffs rose.24  
Despite the approximations required by the data, a fairly conservative set of assumptions suggest that 
the existing volume of hiring and expansions at small firms is sufficiently large to absorb the entire of 
amount of the credits being proposed in Massachusetts and Connecticut. If 1) small firm expansion in 
2010 and 2010 remained as low as levels in 2009, 2) quarterly gross jobs gains were 80 percent of an-
nual gains at expanding firms and 65 percent at opening firms, and 3) only half of workers at small firms 
work 35 hours or more per week, there would already be 44,000 jobs eligible for the credit in Massachu-
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 setts each year and 15,000 in Connecticut, even without the credit. This is more than enough to absorb 
all of the budgeted credits in both states. Since the credits are available first-come-first-serve and even 
more gross job creation is expected in 2010 and 2011, there may be no credit available for firms who 
might actually expand because of the credits’ existence. Knowing this might serve as a major obstacle for 
firms contemplating creating jobs based on the expected benefit of the credit. 
Under these same assumptions, there are already 5,700 eligible jobs in Rhode Island. Without a cap, the 
size of the credit will not be “used up” in a similar fashion, but the cost of the credit may exceed the costs 
anticipated by the state. Under the forecasted budget figure of $10 million, and estimates of total net job 
growth for the state of 4,050 between July 2010 and December 2012, state budget analysts anticipate 
$1.9 million in tax credits will remain for jobs that are not already anticipated by firms.25 With a $2,000 
per-hire credit, the state is expecting to increase employment by 950 jobs. But the 4,050 figure used by 
the state is a poor proxy for the existing growth of jobs eligible for the credit. The estimate of 5,700 de-
scribed here, while still imperfect, is arguably a better proxy for gross expansions of full-time employment 
at small firms. This pushes the cost of the credit up to $11.4 million just to accommodate existing job 
growth. The $10 million budget estimate, though, has no impact on the actual capacity of the small busi-
ness tax act to create jobs. Without a cap, the increase in employment under the credit will be driven only 
by the size of the credit, the responsiveness of firms in Rhode Island both to the generosity of the credit 
and the restrictions attached to the credit.  
FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF SMALL CREDITS AND THE FOCUS ON SMALL FIRMS 
Facing depressed demand and considerable economic uncertainty, employers are likely to require rela-
tively generous subsidies before expanding payrolls. To the extent that the NJTC of the late 1970s was 
successful, it was because the $2,100 credit was equal to 22 percent of a typical full-time worker’s an-
nual earnings.26 An equivalent credit in 2009 would be worth nearly $12,000. Today, in Bishop’s (2008) 
estimation, a tax credit needs to be “larger than $3,000 to grab the attention of employers,” and ideally it 
would be more than twice that amount. At $2,000 and $2,500, the proposed credits in the New England 
states are most likely to be insufficient to grab the attention of employers.  
The CBO also notes that restricting the credit to benefit only small firms will further reduce the impact on 
jobs, because employment at small firms is especially volatile. Given their higher-than-average volume of 
hiring and turnover, directing the credit at small firms would exacerbate the tendency of the program to 
reward job creation that would have occurred anyway. The CBO found that limiting the credit to firms with 
fewer than 100 employees would result in five to ten percent less job growth per dollar spent on a federal 
credit than opening it to all firms.27 If states restrict their credits to even smaller firms (50 employees in 
Massachusetts and 25 in Connecticut), the job impacts will be even smaller.  
The separate restrictions in Rhode Island’s credit pose additional problems. By requiring that individual 
workers be retained for 18 months, and that workers make 250 percent or more of the states’ minimum 
wage, the credit is essentially inapplicable to substantial portions of firms and workers in the state. Na-
tionwide the groups losing most jobs in the Great recession have been young workers with low levels of 
education, and most of those workers earn less than $18.50 when they are employed.28 And the re-
quirement that the individual worker remain with the firm for 18 months will diminish the perceived value 
of the credit for firms. Firms cannot count on actually receiving the credit even if they are expanding, be-
cause the credit will have to be paid back in the event an eligible hire leaves before 18 months. 
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 REMAINING POTENTIAL FOR GAMING THE CREDITS 
Since the proposed credits in all three states would be available to firms of any organizational form and do 
not reward transferring employees between sites or related businesses of a corporation, they circumvent 
some of the more obvious ways a firm might “game” the system. Despite these safeguards, the Massa-
chusetts proposal does leave open one unintended consequence. Because the baseline for measuring 
employment growth is March 31st 2010, it would be possible for firms to lay off workers in advance of the 
March 31st cutoff and re-hire them in April. Given the costs of making this adjustment in terms of worker 
morale and lost output and the relatively small size of the credit, it is unlikely that firms would actually try 
to game the system in this way. But this only underscores the fact that the small size of the credit makes it 
unlikely that employers are likely to actually create jobs because of the credit. 
The proposal in Connecticut contains a similar loophole, giving firms the incentive for very short-term hir-
ing. To be eligible for the credit, hires must be employed during, but cannot have been hired in, the last 
month of the year. So, firms that hire a worker in November 2010 and fire them in January 2011 will be 
eligible for the full $2,500 tax credit.  
THE REALITY OF BALANCED BUDGETS 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, along with all states except for Vermont, have balanced budget re-
quirements. Therefore any expenditure on these tax credits will need to be offset by budget cuts or other 
tax increases, effectively undermining any stimulus from the credit. In fact, the loss in employment (both 
public and private sector) from budget cuts used to finance the employer tax credits would almost cer-
tainly be greater than the number of jobs added due to the tax credits. Each million dollars of across-the-
board reductions in state government spending would eliminate more than 18 jobs in each state; $50 
million in reduced spending would eliminate 938 jobs in Massachusetts, and $10 million in reduced 
spending would eliminate 185 in Connecticut (see Table 1).29 These job losses would impact state em-
ployees laid off due to the cuts, private sector employees at firms losing contracts with the state, and 
other private sector workers at companies where business drops off due to reduced customer spending. 
These combined job losses offset the job gains estimated by most of the analyses of even the federal 
employer tax credits. 
THE TIMING OF THE CREDITS 
Because of the timing of the proposed credits, the current state budgets will not be affected by their 
adoption. In Massachusetts no credits will be paid until April 2012, even for hires that are made as early 
as April 2010. In Connecticut, the non-refundable credits can be used in the following tax year. The intent 
of this design is to give firms an incentive to hire now, when the economy is bad, while allowing state gov-
ernments to defer the costs for another budget cycle. One of the problems with this approach is that state 
budgets are expected to face serious shortfalls for several years. The costs incurred by these employer 
tax credits will lead to real budget cuts and job losses in two or three years. A second problem with delay-
ing the credits is that having to wait so long – up to two years in Massachusetts – to receive the credit 
makes it much less attractive to small firms that are struggling with cash flow in the current economic 
environment.  
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 THERE IS ONLY ONE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,  
BUT STATES DO HAVE BETTER OPTIONS THAN EMPLOYER TAX CREDITS 
Given the small size of the credit, the existing volume of hiring and expansion at small firms, and the fact 
the states will have to cut spending in other areas, we cannot expect these credits to create jobs. Given 
the failure of the U.S. Senate to implement an effective second round of economic stimulus, states may 
despair of any productive policy solutions. But while there are no substitutes for federal action, there are 
more productive routes than these employer tax credits.  
a. Education spending 
By spending money in labor-intensive initiatives, or on programs that draw in matching federal dollars, 
states can create new jobs in a short period of time. Education generally and early childhood education in 
particular are two labor-intensive sectors where state spending could generate additional job growth. In 
Massachusetts, 27 jobs are created per million dollars of education spending; in Connecticut, the same 
funding creates 25.5 jobs. Early childhood education spending is even more effective, creating 30 and 33 
jobs per million dollars in spending, respectively. Spending $50 million on education (including K-12, vo-
cational, and higher education) would generate 1,351 additional jobs in Massachusetts; similar spending 
of $10 million would create 255 jobs in Connecticut and 263 jobs in Rhode Island (Table 1). Spending on 
early childhood education alone (including daycare centers, Headstart, and preschool) would create 
1,498 jobs in Massachusetts, 333 in Connecticut, and 332 in Rhode Island.  
b. Healthcare spending 
While healthcare is not as labor intensive as education or early childhood education – as shown by the 
jobs per million dollars figures in Table 1 – healthcare spending by state governments does bring in addi-
tional federal dollars to the state. State Medicaid spending has a nearly 62 percent matching rate for 
2010 in both Massachusetts and Connecticut; the federal government finances 62 cents of every dollar 
of Medicaid spending undertaken by the state. The matching rate for Rhode Island is nearly 64 percent. 
Thus a $50 million increase in spending by the state leverages $82 million in additional federal dollars, 
for a combined $132 million. As a result, $50 million in increased Medicaid spending by Massachusetts 
would create 2,352 jobs, and $10 million in spending would create 456 jobs in Connecticut and 559 in 
Rhode Island.  
c. Infrastructure spending 
Because it is relatively capital intensive, spending on infrastructure projects will not create as many jobs 
as spending in these other sectors, at least in the short run. The inherent value of infrastructure projects 
in a recession is that they enhance the long-term productivity of the state’s economy, and do so utilizing 
the labor and equipment of sectors that are disproportionately impacted in downturn. However, infra-
structure projects frequently generate federal or private matching funds. If infrastructure investments 
were accompanied by significant matching funds (close to 40 percent of total costs), they would then 
generate additional employment at the same levels as overall state government spending.  
d. Financing state spending 
When states spend money on these program areas, people are put to work and jobs are created. If this 
spending is financed by simply reducing some other part of the state budget, however, the impact on jobs 
will be diminished considerably. Budget cuts and job losses in one part of the budget will undermine the 
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 employment increases from spending on another part of the budget. Short of large increases in federal 
aid to the states, there is no way to finance spending in these areas that will not have some offsetting 
employment losses. 
If, however, states financed this additional spending by raising taxes on affluent households instead of 
simply shifting spending out of other areas or enacting across-the-board tax increases, they could create 
a somewhat greater number of new jobs. Since low-income households generally spend nearly every dol-
lar they earn, additional taxes on those households reduce consumer spending dollar for dollar. Affluent 
households, however, save considerable portions of their incomes; temporary tax increases on those 
households would reduce spending somewhat, but much less than dollar for dollar.30 Conservative esti-
mates from research on consumer responses to changes in income and social security taxes suggest that 
affluent households might reduce their consumption by up to half of the amount of a temporary tax in-
crease.31  
If additional spending on education and healthcare is financed by temporary taxes on high-income 
households (with incomes above $150,000), the impact on job creation will be somewhat greater than if 
the spending is based on simply shifts the existing budget. Financed in this way, spending $50 million in 
Massachusetts would generate 2,096 jobs in the healthcare sector, 1,096 jobs in education, 1,243   
jobs in early childhood education, or 347 jobs in infrastructure. Spending $10 million in Connecticut 
would produce 409 jobs in the healthcare sector, 208 jobs in education, 286 jobs in early childhood edu-
cation, or 69 jobs in infrastructure. And spending $10 million in Rhode Island would create 508 jobs  




Since they do little to increase aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of 
labor in an economy with high unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand, even the federal em-
ployer tax credit proposals should not be expected to dramatically increase employment. Because the 
state proposals are small, targeted to small firms, and – for Massachusetts and Connecticut – capped at 
relatively low levels they can be expected to generate little, if any, gross job gains. The credits are not 
generous enough to motivate firms that weren’t already planning on hiring to do so, and will possibly be 
entirely consumed by the existing volume of hiring and expansion at small firms. Since the state credits 
have to be financed under a balanced budget, they cannot be expected to cause net increases in em-
ployment. The job losses resulting from decreased state spending will almost certainly outstrip the num-
ber of jobs created by the credits. A more effective approach to creating jobs in the states would be to 
increase spending in labor-intensive sectors and programs that are matched by federal funds, such as 
Medicaid. These expenditures would be particularly effective if they were financed through temporary 
high-income tax increases. 
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1 50 1,351 17.2 10.2 27.0 5.1 21.9 255 1,096
Child care
2 50 1,498 19.4 10.6 30.0 5.1 24.9 255 1,243
State & Local 
Investment
3 50 602 6.7 5.3 12.0 5.1 6.9 255 347
Healthcare
4 130 2,352 11.0 7.1 18.1 5.1 41.9 [13.0]* 664 2,097
Education 10 255 16.2 9.3 25.5 4.7 20.8 47 208
Child care 10 333 21.9 11.4 33.3 4.7 28.6 47 286
State & Local 
Investment 10 116 6.6 5.0 11.6 4.7 6.9 47 69
Healthcare 26 456 10.7 6.8 17.5 4.7 40.9 [13.0]* 122 409
Education 10 263 17.0 9.3 26.3 5.1 21.2 51 212
Child care 10 332 21.7 11.4 33.2 5.1 28.1 51 281
State & Local 
Investment 10 120 7.1 4.9 12.0 5.1 6.9 51 69
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